Verifier

The same verifier the server and CLI use, running in your browser. It checks the Ed25519 signature against the trusted key registry, then re-hashes every file and 64 KB chunk. Alter a copy and it tells you which chunk changed, and which recorded events live in it.

Verify in this browser

WebCrypto · Ed25519 · SHA-256 · RFC 9162

Downloads the sealed bytes of SIM-2026-0001, fetches the trusted public key by ID from the key registry, and runs the same verifier the server and CLI run.

IDLEREADINGSIGNATURE_CHECKHASHINGRESULT

Tamper experiments · each runs on a copy in memory

Flip one bit inside the robot's stop-input record

Copies the MCAP in memory and flips one bit inside the bytes of the ROBOT_SAFETY_STOP_INPUT message.

Flip one bit in the facility stop broadcast line

Alters the facility JSONL copy. The file digest fails and the hash chain breaks at that line.

Edit the signed manifest title

Changes the case title to a fault claim. Every file still matches, but the signature no longer does.

Verify against an empty trust registry

Same bytes, but the verifier does not know the signer. A valid signature from an unknown key is not trusted.

Remove an evidence file

Drops the robot recording from the copy, as if it had been withheld.

Verifier response

Waiting

Ready

Click Verify evidence. A green result appears only when the signature and every listed byte check out.

Check your own package

Runs locally. Nothing is uploaded.

Drop manifest.json, manifest.sig and the listed files here, or click to choose.

Limits of this proof

A valid signature shows continuity between the registered signing key and these bytes. Anyone holding the private key could sign a different package. This is not hardware attestation, trusted timestamping or a legal chain-of-custody certificate.