Facility-triggered safety stop
2 source perspectives · asset SIM-AMR-01 · scenario s01-stop
01 / Scope of analysis
Case SIM-2026-0001 (scenario s01-stop). Window: 14000.032 ms of robot recording on the ROBOT_ROS_TIME clock.
Sources: 9 robot topics (kinesim/0.1.0) and 72 facility controller records. Both sources are synthetic and were generated by logically separate components; neither is a physically independent witness.
02 / Recorded chronology
| Event | Shared-clock time | Observation | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| E-002 | 00:00.200 ±0.05 ms | Navigation goal executing | robot-controller-sim |
| E-003 | 00:11.000 ±2.56 ms | Facility controller records zone safety input ESTOP-ZONE-B2 open | facility-controller-sim |
| E-004 | 00:11.003 ±0.56 ms | Facility controller broadcasts stop request to zone approach group | facility-controller-sim |
| E-005 | 00:11.018 ±2.55 ms | Robot safety I/O registers external stop input | robot-controller-sim |
| E-006 | 00:11.020 ±0.05 ms | Robot safety controller starts Category-1 controlled stop | robot-controller-sim |
| E-007 | 00:11.050 ±0.05 ms | Navigation goal aborted | robot-controller-sim |
| E-008 | 00:11.050 ±0.00 ms | Zero velocity command recorded on /cmd_vel | robot-controller-sim |
| E-009 | 00:11.930 ±10.05 ms | Odometry reports speed < 0.01 m/s held ≥ 200 ms | robot-controller-sim |
| E-010 | 00:12.140 ±0.05 ms | Robot safety controller reports drive power removed | robot-controller-sim |
03 / Measured and derived facts
04 / Gaps and limitations
- What opened the facility zone safety input (a person, a test, an equipment fault): the facility source records the input change, not its cause.
- Whether any person or object was in the zone: no camera or person-detection source is present.
- Whether physical contact occurred: no contact sensor is present, and a speed drop does not imply a collision.
- Whether odometry matches the robot's true motion: there is no external ground-truth tracking source.
- The true clock relationship outside assumptions A1–A3.
- Cause, fault or responsibility. These are not assessed by KINWIT.
05 / Questions for a human reviewer
- Was the zone safety input opened by a person, an automated test, or an equipment fault? A separate source (door sensor, camera, operator log) is needed.
- Is the declared PLC scan cycle (and therefore the detection latency bound) correct for the real controller?
- Is the safety-link path facility → robot I/O the only path that could have produced the robot's stop input?
- Would a measured clock reference (PTP / GNSS) be available on site to tighten the alignment interval?
06 / Non-attribution statement
This report orders and measures recorded events. It does not determine cause, fault, liability, regulatory compliance or the accuracy of the underlying sensors. Event order is not causation.
07 / Integrity
Manifest kinwit.evidence.v1, canonicalized with RFC 8785 (integer profile), signed with Ed25519 by kinwit-demo-signer-01 (fingerprint af1a 9a59 c6fc bd01 9be9 4785 6a3d f3e6 de04 b60d 82c3 93a1 5cd8 204c e0f4 beb5). Files are bound by SHA-256 and an RFC 9162 Merkle tree over 64 KiB chunks. Integrity verification shows that these bytes match what the key signed. It does not show that the simulated sensors are accurate.
| File | Bytes | SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
| raw/robot_navigation.mcap | 1318911 | 0e004a82c733d98a17adee5725a41cadf2f0dca42a4b8edc6a90c650d27c6a14 |
| raw/facility_controller.jsonl | 25543 | 54bca92202f5abacd9becec3909c5ba10c83cf76d4534254ac1522169fe562db |
| derived/timeline.json | 112629 | 280483098f9302a45957be94ace8118e5413f7354dcb9b8c44d65c95db9ae910 |
| derived/facts.json | 11931 | 923853643ddccd6eee0365b744cddf2db3d03284c5838235bb0058e1b13849aa |
| derived/report.json | 17550 | 571308bc0e4e5fb99f44863aa6a1ba716c9664cedab61df61bf99e7d2ebf6f72 |